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In its Spring 1985 issue, this Review published an article by
Professors Mary L. Durham and John Q. La Fond attacking the use
of therapeutically oriented criteria for involuntary civil commitment
of the mentally ill. In their article, Durham and La Fond sharply
criticized such criteria in general and the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation's 1983 Model State Law on Civil Commitment (the A.P.A.
Model Law) in particular.'
Durham and La Fond based their attack on an empirical study of
what happened when the state of Washington enlarged its civil com-
mitment power by expanding the scope of the "gravely disabled"
criterion in its Involuntary Treatment Act. In their view, the study
demonstrated that more expansive criteria resulted in: (1) a signifi-
cantly higher rate of involuntary commitment and (2) an increased
probability that patients so committed would become chronic users
of state psychiatric hospitals. Durham and La Fond further asserted
that the surge in involuntary commitments precluded increasingly
overcrowded and understaffed inpatient facilities from accepting
voluntary patients. Generalizing from their interpretation of the
Washington experience, the authors rejected all therapeutically ori-
ented civil commitment criteria as counterproductive for mental
health policy.
Durham and La Fond's article joined an ongoing national debate
about the appropriateness of changing restrictive civil commitment
criteria, which were typical of most state statutes in the 1960s and
early 1970s. Their article's claim to significance is that it brought
empirical data to bear on this debate rather than professional opin-
ions or interests.
* Professor of Law and Psychiatry, Harvard University. Professor Stone was a prin-
cipal author of the American Psychiatric Association's 1983 Model State Law on Civil
Commitment.
1. Durham & La Fond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy Implications of




Durham and La Fond's research, however, should not guide pol-
icy decisions in this difficult area. They have drawn conclusions
about therapeutically oriented criteria that go well beyond the data
available to them. Indeed, subsequent empirical research by Dr.
Steven K. Hoge and his associates flatly contradicts their conclu-
sions, as I shall discuss below. Durham and La Fond have mis-
characterized truly therapeutically oriented criteria, such as those
the A.P.A. recommends, by equating them with the state of Wash-
ington's so-called "therapeutically oriented" standards. The latter
merely expanded the state's commitment powers without making
greater provision for actual therapeutic treatment.
As a principal author of the A.P.A. standards, I can assure readers
that my colleagues and I fully anticipated the danger of a surge in
confinements without a concurrent increase in the resources avail-
able for treatment. It was to avert this danger that the A.P.A. pro-
posed that the criteria include a reasonable prospect of treatment at
the institution to which a patient is committed. In addition, to limit
the number of confinements and protect the rights of patients, the
Model Law permits commitment only after a judicial finding that the
patient is: (1) seriously mentally ill-that is, has a severe form of a
serious mental disorder; (2) suffering; and (3) incompetent to make
medical decisions.
L Summary of Durham and La Fond's Article
Durham and La Fond begin their article by outlining the back-
ground of the law of civil commitment. In their view, the state's
authority to confine the mentally ill rests on two legal principles:
(1) parens patriae, under which the state acts on behalf of individu-
als who are believed to be incapable of acting in their own best in-
terest; and (2) police power, under which the state is authorized to
confine persons in order to prevent harm to the community. 2 Dur-
ham and La Fond describe the current debate over involuntary civil
commitment as focusing, at its extreme, on whether the state should
continue to use its power of coercion to deprive mentally ill people
of their liberty, or whether it should abolish civil commitment in
favor of other systems of social control and care. They describe
more moderate arguments as focusing on the proper grounds for
2. Id. at 395.
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justifying, defining, and controlling the state's civil commitment
powers.
3
The authors note that the historical context of the debate was the
shift in the 1960s and early 1970s from "medical" models of civil
commitment to "legal" models. Medical models grant mental health
officials broad power to confine for treatment people they deter-
mine to be mentally ill. Legal models, in contrast, limit the author-
ity of medical specialists by providing substantive requirements and
procedural safeguards in the commitment process. Durham and La
Fond note that the more recent trend is toward renewed use of med-
ical models and an expansion of the scope of the state's authority to
commit non-dangerous persons thought to be mentally ill. 4 They
apparently view the A.P.A.'s Model Law as symptomatic of this
trend because it would increase the parens patriae power of the
state.
5
Durham and La Fond use civil commitment legislation in Wash-
ington as a case study of changes in state mental health policy. In
1973, Washington enacted a restrictive civil commitment statute
that emphasized dangerousness and narrowed the state's power to
confine mentally ill persons against their will. In 1979, after signifi-
cant negative reaction to the 1973 statute, the Washington legisla-
ture expanded the state's civil commitment powers by broadening
the definition of those who could be involuntarily committed. The
legislature did not, however, significantly alter the actual commit-
ment procedures.
6
After studying the Washington situation, Durham and La Fond
report, among other findings, that: (1) persons in the state were
committed under the new, expansive statutory criteria well before the
effective date of the statute; (2) the number of involuntarily commit-
ted patients increased significantly, and many patients who had had
no previous contact with state psychiatric hospitals were committed
3. Id. at 396. Whatever the nature of the theoretical debate, no state has in fact
abolished civil commitment. The current policy debate centers on choosing appropriate
substantive criteria for commitment.
4. Id. at 397. Durham and La Fond's definition of legal and medical models is mis-
leading in the present context. Due process safeguards are applied today in all civil com-
mitment proceedings, whether the criteria are legally oriented to dangerousness or
medically oriented to need for treatment. Durham and La Fond identify Alaska, North
Carolina and Texas as states that, in addition to Washington, "have recently revised
their commitment statutes by changing the substantive criteria for commitment to ex-
pand the scope of the state's authority to hospitalize coercively persons deemed men-
tally ill." Durham & La Fond, supra note 1, at 398 n.19.
5. Id. at 398-99.




to these facilities for the first time; (3) the major state mental hospi-
tal became extremely overcrowded and tried unsuccessfully to limit
new admissions; and (4) voluntary patients were virtually excluded
from state mental hospitals. From this evidence, Durham and La
Fond apparently conclude that any commitment plan that would ex-
pand a state's power without simultaneously increasing hospital
funding would be an irresponsible policy.
7
Given their assertion that restrictive legal criteria based on dan-
gerousness are preferable to therapeutic criteria, one might hope
that Durham and La Fond would present some objective review of
their preferred approach, setting out its costs as well as its benefits.
But not only do they fail to consider adequately the costs to patients
and their families of restrictive dangerousness criteria; they also un-
derestimate those costs they do acknowledge. This unfortunate
weakness becomes all the more troubling when one reviews Dur-
ham's other publications dealing with this same research, in which
she lists some of the costs of a restrictive policy.
8
II. The Washington State Legislation and the A. P.A. Model Law
A central question in the current civil commitment debate is
whether to allow for the involuntary confinement and treatment of
mentally ill patients who demonstrate clear signs of psychotic deteri-
oration but who are not dangerous to others or to themselves. The
A.P.A. Model Law answers this question in the affirmative, if the se-
riously mentally ill patient is suffering, treatable, and incompetent
to make medical decisions, and if the patient has a reasonable pros-
pect of receiving treatment (that is, if there is treatment available at
the institution to which the patient would be committed). 9 The
7. Id. at 401, 444-45.
8. See, e.g., Pierce, Durham & Fisher, The Impact of Public Policy and Publicity on
Admissions to State Mental Health Hospitals, 11 J. Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 41, 42-43
(1986); Durham & Pierce, Legal Intervention in Civil Commitment: The Impact of
Broadened Commitment Criteria, Annals 42, 43 (Mar. 1986); Pierce, Durham & Fisher,
The Impact of Broadened Civil Commitment Standards on Admissions to State Mental
Hospitals, 142 Am. J. Psychiatry 104 (1985). In these articles, Durham and her co-
authors acknowledge criticisms that restrictive commitment criteria have resulted in:
(1) denial of voluntary admission to some patients; (2) persons "falling through the
cracks" in community outpatient service systems; (3) "psychiatric ghettos" in large ur-
ban areas; (4) migration of the mentally ill population from hospitals into jails and pris-
ons; (5) relatives' abandonment of mentally ill persons who refuse voluntary
commitment; and (6) professional and ethical problems for psychiatrists who want to
commit gravely disabled and other persons who, in their professional judgment, need
hospitalization.
9. Stromberg & Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
20 Harv. J. on Legis. 275 (1983) [hereinafter Stromberg & Stone]. It should be noted
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A.P.A. recommended that these truly therapeutically oriented crite-
ria be added to the three requirements for civil commitment com-
mon to most state statutes-"dangerous to others," "dangerous to
self," and "gravely disabled."
No state has ever adopted the complete package of commitment
criteria recommended by the A.P.A. The few states that have
adopted the deterioration language of the A.P.A.'s therapeutically
oriented criteria have not, to my knowledge, included in their stat-
utes three elements key to the A.P.A. recommendations-patient
suffering, patient incompetency, and treatment availability.
The 1973 Washington civil commitment statute created the most
restrictive non-therapeutically oriented regime of any state;10 the
criteria were thus prototypical of those favored by most civil liber-
tarians. 11 Under this regime, individuals could be involuntarily
committed only if they met one or more of the narrow standards:
dangerous to others; 12 dangerous to self; 13 or gravely disabled.'
4
Furthermore, confinement-except of persons found dangerous to
others-was strictly limited in duration. Suicidal patients were to be
released in less than a month, even if they remained acutely suicidal.
The narrow scope of these criteria is exemplified by Washington's
definition in 1973 of gravely disabled: "a condition in which a per-
son as a result of a mental disorder is in danger of serious physical
harm resulting from a failure to provide for his essential needs."'
15
This provision made it clear that the degree of the person's mental
suffering and the potential for mental deterioration were not rele-
that La Fond had adopted a similar version of these therapeutically oriented criteria in a
1981 article, in which he claimed that such criteria were both morally and legally accept-
able. La Fond, An Examination of the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30
Buffalo L. Rev. 499, 526 (1981). In this article, he also had speculated that these criteria
would result in fewer, rather than more, commitments. Id. at 534.
10. Durham & La Fond, supra note 1, at 402-03. The statute is codified at Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. §§ 71.05.010-.05.930 (1975) (as amended).
11. While Durham and La Fond do not claim to be civil libertarians, concerned
about maximizing liberty, it should be noted that emphasizing civil liberties while slight-
ing humanitarian goals obscures the social value of treating mentally ill people rather
than simply banishing them to the streets.
12. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 71.05.020(3)(a) (1975). "The 'danger to others' crite-
rion was satisfied by behavior which 'had caused harm or substantial risk of harm in the
past, or which had placed others in reasonable fear of sustaining harm.' " Durham & La
Fond, supra note 1, at 403. The authors also note that "[t]he statute was not specific
regarding evidence that would establish dangerousness or harm to others." Id. at 403.
13. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 71.05.020(3)(b) (1975). "[A] person was dangerous to
herself if she had threatened or attempted self-inflicted physical harm or suicide." Dur-
ham & La Fond, supra note 1, at 403.
14. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 71.05.020 (1975). See also Durham & La Fond, supra
note 1, at 403.




vant; only "physical harm" was relevant. As long as a family pro-
vided for the patient's essential needs, the patient could not be
treated involuntarily unless he or she actually became dangerous to
self or others.
The apparent legal objective of the "gravely disabled" criterion
was to draw a bright line between mental illness that is "harmless"
for legal purposes and mental illness that results in starvation, dehy-
dration, and physical exposure; the restrictive standard permits con-
finement only if the latter physical dangers are involved. Durham
and La Fond criticize the 1979 expansion of this criterion in Wash-
ington because it allegedly caused a counterproductive increase in
the number of persons involuntarily committed for treatment of le-
gally harmless mental illness.
"Although there is no direct evidence on the point," they argue,
"it seems reasonable to conclude that, prior to their commitment,
these individuals were coping adequately in the community at least
to the extent of organizing a daily routine and providing for their
shelter, food, and clothing needs."' 16 In my experience, however,
families do not usually abandon to involuntary commitment loved
ones who are "coping adequately" and "organizing a daily routine."
Nor do contemporary mental health professionals usually consider
it appropriate to hospitalize such persons involuntarily. It seems
more reasonable to conclude that the expanded standard alleviated
the dilemma of families faced with either caring for or abandoning a
recalcitrant mentally ill relative and allowed for the treatment of
more individuals who needed help but were too ill to seek it.
Within months of passing its prototypical civil libertarian commit-
ment law, the Washington legislature amended it in 1974 to allow
for additional periods of confinement of persons not dangerous to
others but gravely disabled or dangerous to themselves. 17 Five
years later, in response to public pressure, the legislature voted to
expand the criterion of gravely disabled to include a person who
"manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by
repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over
his or her actions and [who] is not receiving such care as is essential
for his or her health or safety."' 8 The expanded criterion does not
address the questions of whether the patient is actually treatable and
whether the patient is competent to make medical judgments. This
417
16. Durham & La Fond, supra note 1, at 431.
17. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 71.05.280 (1975) (amended 1979).
18. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 71.05.020(1) (Supp. 1986).
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expanded requirement for commitment-not the therapeutically ori-
ented criteria called for by the A.P.A.-was the basis of Durham and
La Fond's empirical research. It is only through misinterpretation
that Durham and La Fond apply their data to condemn the A.P.A.'s
Model Law.
Durham and La Fond discuss recent state legislation, including
that of Washington, as if it had expanded civil commitment criteria
in a therapeutically oriented manner similar to that proposed by the
A.P.A. t 9 They relegate to a footnote the pivotal distinction between
the A.P.A. Model Law and other state legislation, including the
Washington statute: the A.P.A. Model Law, unlike most state stan-
dards, requires that the disorder be "treatable at or through the fa-
cility to which a patient is committed." 20 The A.P.A. proposes a
mandatory probable cause hearing at which, within five working
days of initial commitment, a judge must find that the disorder is
"treatable at or through the facility;" otherwise the patient must be
released.21
The distinction that Durham and La Fond fail to make is that be-
tween so-called therapeutically oriented criteria-which expand civil
commitment solely by altering descriptions of mental illness to in-
clude mental deterioration-and truly therapeutically oriented crite-
ria-which also require patient treatability, mental suffering, and
incompetence to make treatment decisions and availability of treat-
ment. Although Durham and La Fond conflate these two types of
commitment criteria, only the A.P.A. standards should be character-
ized as therapeutically oriented. The A.P.A.'s provisions regarding
the availability of treatment, treatability, mental suffering, and in-
competence to make treatment decisions make its Model Law a
bona fide therapeutically oriented approach. The Model Law is fun-
damentally different from the Washington and other state statutes,
which are silent on these essential requirements. 22
19. Durham & La Fond, supra note 1, at 398-99.
20. Id. at 399 n.24 (quoting Stromberg & Stone, supra note 9, at 330).
21. Stromberg & Stone, supra note 9, at 322-23. Judges may of course ignore criteria
such as "treatable" and "reasonable prospect of treatment." Indeed, this possibility is a
common criticism of the A.P.A. Model Law, made by lawyers concerned that judges will
have too much discretion under the Model Law. To design a civil commitment statute
on the premise that judges cannot be trusted was not the task the A.P.A. set for itself,
however, nor is it the premise on which Durham and La Fond criticize the A.P.A. Model
Law.
22. As Durham herself noted in an earlier article, "Unlike the A.P.A. Model Law,
Washington law does not require that the patient have a treatable condition or lack the
capacity to make an informed treatment decision." Durham, Implications of Need-for-
Treatment Laws: A Study of Washington State's Involuntary Treatment Act, 36 Hosp. &




The false analogy between the Washington legislation and the
A.P.A. Model Law leads Durham and La Fond to misapply their crit-
icisms of the former to the latter. The 1979 Washington legislation
allowed for an increased number of commitments, drawn from ap-
proximately the same number of referrals, without a corresponding
increase in hospital resources; the result was a short-term inability
to provide adequate care to hospitalized patients. From this specific
set of circumstances, Durham and La Fond jump to the conclusion
that therapeutically oriented criteria, including the A.P.A. stan-
dards, should be rejected as inherently expansive and counter-
productive.
One does not need to undertake a costly empirical project, how-
ever, to argue that any expansion of civil commitment will cause
medical and logistical problems unless more resources are allocated
to the facilities charged with the increased responsibility. To assert
that public policy on civil commitment must reflect this considera-
tion is hardly a new or controversial conclusion. The most impor-
tant lesson of recent civil commitment history is precisely that the
central defect in implementing policies of civil commitment has
been the failure to provide the necessary resources. The A.P.A. it-
self has argued that "[rlemedying this defect requires not only clari-
fying the basis for commitment, but also enforcing legal rights and
providing adequate funds to ensure that the conditions of confine-
ment accord with its theoretical purposes."
'23
The A.P.A. Model Law, then, had already anticipated this obvious
problem, which Durham and La Fond report as one of the main
fruits of their empirical research, by including "treatable" and "rea-
sonable prospect of treatment" in its recommended criteria. The
A.P.A. criteria were intended specifically to prevent the pattern of
confinement without treatment, a pattern that would defeat any re-
gime of civil commitment. Under these truly therapeutically ori-
ented criteria, confinement would be precluded when a lack of
budgetary or physical resources left no reasonable prospect of treat-
ment for the patient. A judge must make this determination at a
mandatory probable cause hearing.
As one of the principal drafters of the Model Law, and a co-author
of its commentary, I can attest that the intent of the A.P.A. criteria in
any case was not to expand the number of citizens who would be
committed. Rather, the intent was to change the focus of civil com-
mitment and the categories of persons committed from those cur-
23. Stromberg & Stone, supra note 9, at 283.
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rently inappropriately committed to those likely to benefit from
confinement. Durham and La Fond ignore sections of the A.P.A.
Model Law and commentary that show the A.P.A.'s recognition of
the problems of expansion as well as its attempts to build in protec-
tions against them.
The authors characterize as expansive the policy behind the thera-
peutically oriented A.P.A. criteria by quoting out of context. They
claim that "[t]he commentary to the model statute indicates clearly
that the intent of the drafters is to permit commitment of many citi-
zens who are not presently committable under current legal stan-
dards."2 4 Their footnote supporting this contention quotes a
sentence that is only part of a summary paragraph: "In sum, the
criteria in the Model Law are in some respects broader than those in
some current state laws ... ,"25 They omit the rest of the para-
graph, which adds that "in other respects the criteria are stricter
"26
In the actual commentary on the Model Law, Clifford Stromberg
and I discuss some of those "other respects" in the section entitled,
"Some Major Categories of Persons Who Do Not Meet the Criteria
for Involuntary Commitment." 27 The first category of those not
committable, "Does NOT Suffer From a 'Severe Mental Disorder,'"
precludes from psychiatric confinement many persons now commit-
table either as gravely disabled or as dangerous to self or others.
The second category, "Does NOT Lack Capacity to Make a Rea-
soned Decision Concerning Treatment," precludes from confine-
ment those persons confinable under most current state law as
gravely disabled or as dangerous to themselves or others who are
competent to make treatment decisions. The third category, "Is
NOT Likely to Cause Harm to Himself or Others or to Deteriorate,"
precludes from confinement some persons now committable in
some states as gravely disabled. The fourth category, "Is NOT
Treatable," precludes from confinement all patients for whom civil
commitment is now mere preventive detention. 28 These specified
categories of persons not committable are especially noteworthy in a
Model Law that Durham and La Fond label as counterproductively
expansive.
24. Durham & La Fond, supra note 1, at 399 (emphasis in original).
25. Id. at 399 n.25.
26. Stromberg & Stone, supra note 9, at 335.
27. Id.




III. Empirical Evidence Contradicting Durham
and La Fond's Conclusions
Empirical evidence that the proposed A.P.A. criteria indeed
would not prove to be expansive in practice can be found in a recent
study by Steven K. Hoge, M.D., Paul S. Appelbaum, M.D., and Alex-
ander Greer, J.D. These authors compare commitment criteria,
which I developed and published in 1975 and which later became
the basis of the Model Law criteria, to current civil commitment
standards in Massachusetts 29 (which are similar to those enacted by
Washington State in 1973). Hoge's study, flatly contradicting Dur-
ham and La Fond, finds that the Stone criteria would be substan-
tially more restrictive than the Massachusetts statutory criteria based
on dangerousness. 30
Hoge's study addresses "prospectively the question of what effect
adoption of the Stone (or closely related) criteria would have on the
number of patients admitted to and excluded from a mental health
system." 3' He found not only "that many currently committable pa-
tients would be uncommittable under Stone's scheme, but also that
few patients now uncommittable would be added to the system."
32
An earlier study by Monahan had reported that only 46% of Cali-
fornia patients committed in an emergency setting would also meet
the proposed Stone criteria. 33 But Monahan's study lacked data on
how many patients excluded by California criteria would have been
included under the Stone criteria; nor did the data permit an accu-
rate determination of the effect of the incompetency requirement on
the number of those committed. Nonetheless, Monahan's published
empirical evidence had already suggested that the Stone criteria-
and hence, the more recent, similar A.P.A. standards-would not
expand the number of patients committed, despite the claims of
Durham and La Fond.
Hoge's more recent study also demonstrates that if the Stone cri-
teria replaced the Massachusetts standards, fewer patients with in-
tractable and untreatable personality disorders would be committed
29. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123, §§ 1-36A (West 1986 & Supp. 1987).
30. Hoge, Appelbaum & Green, An Empirical Comparison of the Stone and Danger-
ousness Criteria for Civil Commitment, abstract of a paper presented at the American
Psychiatric Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, May 13, 1987 (on file with the Yale L.
& Pol'y Rev.).
31. Id. at 5.
32. Id. at 13.
33. Monahan, Ruggiero & Friedlander, Stone-Roth Model of Civil Commitment and
the California Dangerousness Standard, 39 Archives of Gen. Psychiatry 1267, 1268
(1982).
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to hospitals and patients with more serious, treatable psychoses
would predominate. 34 This conclusion suggests that the truly thera-
peutically oriented Model Law would in fact work as it was designed
to.
My original conception of the A.P.A. Model Law criteria assumed
that the only valid justification for involuntary confinement in a
mental hospital is paternalism, or parens patriae. Dangerous people
who are competent to make medical decisions should be the respon-
sibility of the criminal justice, not the mental health, system. Men-
tally ill persons who are not suffering give those who would impose
treatment no legal or moral justification for doing so. Only persons
who suffer, who are incompetent to make treatment decisions, and
who could be treated would be confined under the proposed crite-
ria. Hoge's study suggests, as I have always believed, that criteria
suggested by parens patriae principles are both more restrictive and
more therapeutic than purportedly restrictive criteria based on
dangerousness.
IV. Limits of Durham and La Fond's Empirical Data
The ostensible significance of Durham and La Fond's article lies
in its rejection of therapeutically oriented civil commitment goals on
the basis of empirical evidence-not mere professional opinion.
The authors' attack on therapeutically oriented criteria is inade-
quate in part because they fail to ask important empirical questions.
In order for social scientists to evaluate significant changes in pol-
icy, they must compare the new configuration of costs and benefits
with the old. Durham and La Fond fail to offer any empirical data on
the costs and benefits of the original regime,3 5 in spite of their con-
cession that many mental health professionals and patients' families
were considerably dissatisfied with the original restrictive commit-
ment statute.36 For example, they do not present any comparative
34. Hoge, supra note 31, at 10.
35. If Durham and La Fond had studied the policy of deinstitutionalization in the
same way they studied civil commitment, that is, by emphasizing only the short-term
costs of deinstitutionalization and ignoring its potential long-term benefits, they would
have had to conclude that no legislature should embark on a new policy of deinstitution-
alization before planning and funding adequate community alternatives to
institutionalization.




empirical data on the successful prevention of violence or suicide
under the new and the old regimes. Nor do they present any empir-
ical data on the number of patients with serious and treatable
mental disorders who went untreated under the restrictive regime.
They do not present data on the number of homeless mentally ill,
on the suffering of families whose schizophrenic members could not
be confined involuntarily, or on the efficacy of treatment actually
provided to those civilly committed under this old regime.
It is important to know whether restrictive regimes based on dan-
gerousness select patients who need and can benefit from hospitali-
zation. If they do not, then such regimes are counterproductive;
they waste hospital resources, undermine the therapeutic mission of
the professional staff, and eventually contribute to the deterioration
of the quality of care available in the public sector. Admittedly,
these are not easy subjects on which to conduct a quantifiable in-
quiry. But it is unacceptable to assume away these important empir-
ical questions.
The study done by Durham and La Fond exploits a "natural ex-
periment," the Washington legislative change from the "restrictive"
1973 criteria to the "expansive" 1979 criteria for civil commitment.
When using such natural experiments, however, it is particularly im-
portant to acknowledge that any generalizable conclusions must be
drawn from the data with caution because the real situation imposes
limitations on the research design.
For example, Durham and La Fond's conclusion that the ex-
panded law had significantly different impacts in different counties
within Washington demonstrates the inherent limitations of their
results when extended beyond the state itself. Durham and La Fond
report that the "influence of county was so strong that we per-
formed many of our analyses separately for each county;"3 7 they ex-
plain that "[c]ounties differ with respect to administration,
management and available resources." 38 Because states differ just as
dramatically in these respects, generalizing conclusions about the
effects of expansive civil commitment laws from one state to another
is a treacherous endeavor that should be approached with more sci-
entific caution than Durham and La Fond demonstrate.
37. Id. at 415.
38. Id.
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V Misinterpretation of Data
A. Treatment of Voluntary Patients
Durham and La Fond's conclusion that "voluntary patients were
virtually excluded from state hospitals" 39 serves as only one exam-
ple of the distortions that result when conclusions are drawn from
incomplete data. Data from the Washington study show that after
civil commitment criteria were broadened, "voluntary admissions
fell from 46.7% of total admissions to 25.3%, with the absolute
numbers declining 26.3% from 518 to 382."40 Yet the authors
present no new data on the number of patients who actually sought
voluntary admission and were refused under the new expansive re-
gime-nor, for purposes of comparison, the number of those re-
fused under the old restrictive one. Furthermore, there was no
substantial increase in the total number of patients referred after 1979 to the
County Designated Mental Health Professionals [CDMHP] (the or-
ganization that initiates civil commitments in Washington), even
though the percentage of patients referred who were eventually in-
voluntarily committed rose significantly. 41
This limited data just as reasonably suggests that patients who
might have accepted voluntary status were not excluded from treat-
ment, but that the CDMHP simply processed some of them as invol-
untary patients. Clinical experience suggests that the CDMHP may
simply have chosen to commit some of these patients involuntarily
rather than invest the time and effort necessary to persuade them to
accept voluntary status. Durham and La Fond, however, claim that
the mental health system provided virtually no treatment to volun-
tary patients under the expanded regime, when the data available is
simply inadequate to support such a misleading conclusion. The
data at most document a decrease in the number of patients labeled
as voluntary.
Durham and La Fond further confuse matters by arguing that pa-
tients who come to hospitals voluntarily respond better to treatment
than involuntarily committed patients. 42 To support this argument,
they refer to a body of literature that primarily deals with ethical
questions about involuntary psychiatric treatment, not with the ef-
fectiveness of involuntary short-term biological psychiatric treat-
39. Id. at 401.
40. Id. at 417.
41. Id. at 418.




ment.43 Their suggestion that voluntary treatment is more effective
than involuntary treatment can be neither supported nor refuted on
the basis of their study. Their misinterpretation of the data on vol-
untary patients thus leads them to the unfounded conclusion that
the expansive Washington criteria caused state psychiatric hospitals
to turn away patients who would have benefited more from treat-
ment than those admitted. I find this conclusion particularly troub-
ling because, in my experience, it is the restrictive criteria based on
dangerousness that have caused psychiatric hospitals to turn away
people who would have benefitted more from treatment than the
patients admitted.
B. Mischaracterization of Patients
Durham and La Fond's focus on legal definitions of the "chroni-
cally mentally ill" rather than on clinical realities 44 also exemplifies a
failure to interpret their data properly. Some mental disorders, par-
ticularly schizophrenia, tend to follow a chronic course with recur-
ring episodes of increased agitation, delusions, and decompensation
in mental and social functioning. Although some patients with these
disorders return to their prior level of functioning, many deteriorate
over time. Long-term custodial care in inadequate institutions may
contribute to deterioration, but deterioration certainly occurs
outside institutions as well.
4 5
Washington's community mental health act defines a chronic pa-
tient as someone "who has undergone two or more episodes of hos-
pital care for a mental disorder within the two preceding years." 4 6
Durham and La Fond do not explain the purpose of this definition
or its significance. In fact, patients can be chronically mentally ill
whether or not they are hospitalized. If the legal definition of this
condition is taken seriously, then a restrictive regime can reduce the
numbers of chronically mentally ill patients in the state simply by
refusing them admission to hospitals. The larger the population of
homeless mentally ill under such a regime, the smaller the number
of officially chronically mentally ill. On the other hand, if the state
43. Id. at 432 n.155. A study of patients involuntarily admitted in 1974 to
Harborview Hospital concluded that "the Seattle experience strongly suggests that if the
needs of involuntary patients are appropriately addressed, then treatment can be equal
to or better than that of their voluntary counterparts .... ," Sata & Goldberg, A Study of
Involuntary Patients in Seattle, 28 Hosp. & Comm. Psychiatry 834, 837 (1977).
44. Durham & La Fond, supra note 1, at 421 n.122.
45. Schwartz & Goldfinger, The New Chronic Patient: Clinical Characteristics of an
Emerging Subgroup, 32 Hosp. & Comm. Psychiatry 470 (1981).
46. Durham & La Fond, supra note 1, at 421 n.122.
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offers access to inpatient care, the numbers of chronically mentally
ill patients will increase. The "official" numbers thus reveal nothing
meaningful about the real prevalence of chronic mental illness in
Washington.
Durham and La Fond argue that "[g]rowth in the number of cli-
ents re-entering the commitment system has consequently increased
the likelihood of the growth in the number of those classified as
'chronically mentally ill.' "'47 In a subsequent discussion of their
findings, the authors drop the qualifier "classified" and conclude
that "the stage may now be set for 'old' clients to become chronic
patients in the future." 48 This twist of interpretation is misleading
because it suggests that their empirical study has demonstrated that
expansive commitment criteria-and, by implication, therapeutically
oriented criteria-will create chronic mental patients. The hidden
invalid assumption is that mental illness does not become chronic
without the intervention of the state. Durham and La Fond fail to
acknowledge not only that mental patients can become chronic with-
out state intervention, but also that some of these patients may need
and benefit from repeated state hospitalizations, especially during
recurrent acute episodes.
Conclusion
Durham and La Fond's research and findings cannot be credited
as a guide to future policy in the difficult area of formulating civil
commitment criteria. Their failure to recognize the basic limitations
of their empirical data and their misapplication of their results to the
A.P.A. Model Law clearly invalidate their rejection of therapeutically
oriented criteria. Anyone concerned about mental health policy to-
day recognizes that a policy of warehousing the mentally ill is an
insupportable invasion of civil rights for no therapeutic purpose.
But there are those who apparently do not realize that a restrictive
civil commitment regime based solely on dangerousness also has
significant costs; its result is often a haphazard system of preventive
detention for some and non-therapeutic neglect for others.
There is an obvious need to chart a new course. That new course
will have to reflect both the legal justifications for loss of liberty and
the therapeutic goals society can reasonably expect to achieve. Civil
commitment criteria that ignore legal justifications are unaccept-
able, as is confinement that serves no useful therapeutic purpose.
47. Id. at 421 (emphasis added).




Civil commitment criteria and policy must instead require both a
legal justification for confinement and a medical determination that
the person confined will benefit from the treatment available. The
time for talking about medical versus legal models has passed; it is
now time to talk about a medico-legal model.
The Model Law promulgated by the A.P.A. aims in the right di-
rection. It rejects the expansion of civil commitment that leads to
warehousing. It rejects the restrictive standards based on danger-
ousness that result in haphazard preventive detention for some and
non-therapeutic neglect for others. It is a policy that makes the
legal system, the state, and the mental health system accountable
when civil commitment is invoked. Therapeutic goals are necessary
but not sufficient; legal justifications for loss of liberty are necessary
but not sufficient. Legal justifications and therapeutic goals to-
gether, with institutional and budgetary resources to support them,
are necessary and sufficient to make civil commitment acceptable. A
policy that ignores either of these essential elements will fail, and at
a cost measured in human suffering. It is a cost that the mentally ill
and their families have paid many times and in large measure for
most of this nation's history.
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